Preamble

As the competent administrative authority pursuant to section 6 (1) of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG) and Article 4(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV), BaFin exercises supervision of institutions in accordance with the KWG. Moreover, it is the national competent authority pursuant to Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (SSM Regulation). The Deutsche Bundesbank (hereinafter referred to as "the Bundesbank") is a competent authority pursuant to Article 4(1) of the CRD IV to the extent defined in section 7 of the KWG. The SSM Regulation is without prejudice to the responsibilities and powers of the national authorities not conferred on the European Central Bank (ECB) (fifth paragraph of Article 1 of the SSM Regulation, sentences 2-4 of point (9) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank (SSM Framework Regulation)).

Section 7 (1) of the KWG governs cooperation between BaFin and the Bundesbank in respect of the ongoing monitoring of institutions by the Bundesbank. Pursuant to section 1 of the German Financial Stability Act (Gesetz zur Überwachung der Finanzstabilität – FinStabG), the Bundesbank's responsibilities include ongoing analysis of factors that are key to financial stability (macroprudential supervision).

Pursuant to section 7 (2) sentence 2 of the KWG, BaFin's guidelines on ongoing supervision shall be issued in agreement with the Bundesbank. These guidelines, and thus the Supervision Guideline as well, are intended to ensure the consistency and quality of supervisory activity and a transparent division of responsibilities with as little duplication of work as possible and are to be observed by both the Bundesbank and BaFin in carrying out ongoing supervision.
The ECB took on the tasks assigned to it by the SSM Regulation on 4 November 2014. Since then, it has carried out, in particular, direct supervision of significant groups of institutions with their registered office in Germany and the eurozone and has performed the supervisory function over the national supervisory authorities within the SSM with the aim of ensuring a harmonised, high-quality supervision of less significant institutions. To ensure that German banking supervision under the SSM is consistent and free of contradictions, it is necessary to create clear structures in the cooperation between BaFin and the Bundesbank.

To this end, the Supervision Guideline clearly differentiates between BaFin's responsibilities and those of the Bundesbank in such a way that delegation of responsibilities is clear and that the information flow essential to performing the tasks is ensured.

1 Definition of "significant institutions" and "less significant institutions"

The division of responsibilities between BaFin and the Bundesbank differs according to the classification of the institutions and groups of institutions as significant and less significant in accordance with the SSM Regulation.

1.1 Significant institutions

(1) Significant institutions within the meaning of the present Guideline are institutions and groups of institutions which are classified as significant by the ECB and defined in accordance with the criteria in Article 6(4) and (5b) of the SSM Regulation in conjunction with Articles 39-42 and 50-66 of the SSM Framework Regulation.

(2) The Bundesbank and BaFin are involved in the ECB's supervision of significant institutions via their participation in the joint supervisory teams (JSTs). BaFin shall appoint the NCA sub-coordinator of each JST in accordance with Article 3(1) and Article 4(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. The Bundesbank is a national central bank within the meaning of point (9) of Article 2 of the SSM Framework Regulation and shall provide its own sub-coordinator for the JST.

1.2 Less significant institutions

Less significant institutions within the meaning of the present Guideline are all institutions and groups of institutions which are classified as less significant by the ECB and do not come under section 1.1 of this Guideline. Pursuant to section 5.4.1 of the ECB Supervisory Manual, such institutions are divided into low, medium and high priority institutions.

Credit institutions which are not CRR credit institutions as well as financial services institutions and payment institutions are essentially treated as less significant institutions as far as cooperation with the Bundesbank is concerned. In this context, it should be noted that the ECB does not perform any supervisory function for these institutions.

1.3 Transfer of institutions

Transferring an institution to the direct supervision of the ECB or removing it from ECB supervision to national responsibility requires a process of transition lasting around a year (part 5.2, sections 1.3 and 1.4 of the ECB Supervisory Manual). All stages of the process of establishing/dissolving a JST are initially agreed upon by BaFin and the Bundesbank together and then subsequently with the ECB.

2 Basis of cooperation

2.1 Functions and responsibilities in the supervision of significant institutions

(1) The provisions of the SSM Regulation and the SSM Framework Regulation and Instructions (including the ECB Supervisory Manual) which are based on the SSM Regulation envisage that BaFin and the Bundesbank jointly participate in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. This participation is based on the division of responsibilities made on the national level pursuant to sections 6 and 7 of the KWG. The preparation and implementation of any acts related to credit institutions pursuant to Article 6(3) of the SSM Regulation is the responsibility of BaFin alone. This includes in particular authorisation procedures, the review of qualifying holdings, the suitability of management and supervisory board members, the authorisation of internal risk measurement procedures and procedures relating to recovery and resolution plans. BaFin shall assist the ECB, taking into account the contributions of the Bundesbank.

(2) The ECB undertakes the direct supervision of the significant institutions as part of the JSTs.

(3) BaFin and the Bundesbank's work in the JSTs shall be guided by the principle of trustful cooperation. Both institutions should possess the same information at all times.

(4) BaFin and the Bundesbank shall seek to communicate a joint position to the ECB with regard to proposals for discretionary decisions and assessments under supervisory law. If, in individual cases and despite prior escalation through official channels, BaFin and the Bundesbank do not find a joint position, the BaFin subcoordinator shall determine the positions of the BaFin and Bundesbank staff members in the JST and this shall become the basis of the further work in the JST. This does not exclude the possibility of an open discussion of points of difference in advance and with the involvement of the ECB coordinator.

2.2 Functions and responsibilities in the supervision of less significant institutions

2.2.1 The role of the ECB

The ECB maintains a supervisory function over the national supervisory authorities within the SSM with the aim of ensuring that supervision of less significant institutions is harmonised and of a high quality. Responsibility for the supervision of these institutions remains with BaFin, subject to the powers of the ECB pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) and (c) of the SSM Regulation. In addition, the ECB can decide to take over supervisory responsibility at any time if it judges this to be necessary to ensure a coherent application of high supervisory standards.

2.2.2 Supervision by BaFin

(1) BaFin shall make the final summary and forward-looking assessment of:

• whether the risks that institutions have assumed are matched by policies, strategies, procedures and mechanisms that guarantee sound risk management and sound risk cover; and
  
• whether the institution has ensured that the risks that it has assumed are matched by adequate liquidity and capital.

The primary basis for the assessment shall be the institution's risk profile.

(2) Notwithstanding the Bundesbank's power to evaluate audit findings, the final assessment and decision-making power on all supervisory measures and questions of interpretation shall rest with BaFin. In this respect BaFin will normally draw on the Bundesbank's evaluations in reaching its decisions.

(3) BaFin shall take all decisions on supervisory measures on the basis of its assessment. Such measures shall include in particular (general) administrative acts including all audit orders and the definition of supervisory requirements. BaFin also, in consultation with the Bundesbank, shall determine the supervisory strategy and supervisory planning on the basis of the supervisory findings, provisions, warnings and recommendations of the relevant European institutions and the Financial Stability Committee and taking into account the results of the risk committee and the Committee on Ongoing Supervision. BaFin shall adjust these in the course of the year if necessary. There shall be particularly close coordination between BaFin and the Bundesbank regarding their supervisory activities in advance of and during the implementation of serious supervisory measures.

(4) BaFin shall provide institutions with legally binding information on the application of the KWG, the regulations issued based on it and BaFin's circulars as well as the relevant EU provisions.

2.2.3 Ongoing monitoring by the Bundesbank

(1) The Bundesbank shall perform the functions of ongoing monitoring of less significant institutions pursuant to section 7 (1) of the KWG, with restrictions pursuant to 2.2.4 of this Guideline. Ongoing monitoring shall comprise in particular the ascertainment of facts, the analysis of the information that it receives and has to collect, the evaluation of current and potential risks based thereon and the evaluation of audit findings. The Bundesbank shall perform its monitoring taking the macroprudential findings from its activity in accordance with the FinStabG, provisions, warnings and recommendations of the relevant European institutions as well as the Financial Stability Committee into account and shall observe BaFin's content requirements.

(2) The Bundesbank shall make the results and evaluations from its ongoing monitoring available to BaFin without undue delay in order that the latter may make a final assessment of and decision on the facts; they will also be included in the risk profile in accordance with part 3.2.1. The Bundesbank shall clarify with the institutions at its own discretion any discrepancies regarding the documents which have to be filed at regular intervals, if necessary invoking the right to demand information pursuant to section 44 (1) sentence 1 of the KWG.

(3) Analysis within the meaning of the present Guideline shall mean information received being summarised and prepared according to its relevance to the functions of banking supervision. Evaluation shall be used hereinafter to mean an assessment of the repercussions of certain facts for the institution in question and their relevance to banking supervision. The information to be analysed and evaluated by the Bundesbank as part of its ongoing monitoring shall include in particular that which is contained in the documents filed by institutions, auditors’ reports pursuant to section 26 of the KWG and annual financial statements. Information obtained from supervisory consultations and the performance and analysis of audits of banking operations shall also be evaluated.

2.2.4 Problem institutions, institutions under intensified supervision and institutions posing a potential systemic risk

(1) Problem institutions are institutions whose financial situation gives cause for particular concern, where serious supervisory findings have been made or for which supervisory interventions are having to be prepared or initiated.

(2) Institutions under intensified supervision will normally be those where the information available to the supervisors strongly suggests the possibility of negative developments. It is also possible for an institution to be put into this category if its not inconsiderable importance for the whole market or for a relevant sub-market gives rise to particular supervisory interest or a deeper insight is to be acquired for comparative purposes.

(3) Pursuant to section 20 (1) sentence 3 of the German Recovery and Resolution Act (Sanierungs- und Abwicklungsgesetz – SAG), an institution poses a potential systemic risk if it is either a global systemically important institution pursuant to section 10f of the KWG (G-SII) or it is another systemically important institution pursuant to section 10g of the KWG (OSII) or if no simplified obligations may be specified for the institution pursuant to the criteria laid down in section 19

(2) of the SAG. BaFin shall undertake the classification of the institutions in consultation with the Bundesbank.

(4) Because of the more rigorous supervisory activities that are imperative in the case of the institutions listed under (1) to (3), close cooperation between BaFin and the Bundesbank is essential. If the information available is not sufficient to enable a final assessment to be made, BaFin may at any time entrust the Bundesbank with the task of ascertaining additional facts and require the Bundesbank to carry out a more in-depth analysis.

3 Supervisors' risk identification instruments

3.1 The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process for significant institutions

(1) Pursuant to Article 4(1)(f) of the SSM Regulation, the ECB is exclusively competent for the carrying out of supervisory reviews of significant institutions. On the basis of that supervisory review, it is allowed to impose additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, specific liquidity requirements and other measures. An SSM-specific Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) is being developed for this purpose.

(2) The Bundesbank and BaFin shall mutually agree on the details of the cooperation if regulatory requirements arise from the SSM activity.

3.2 The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process for less significant institutions

The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) for less significant institutions comprises:

(i) the ascertainment of the facts;

(ii) the analysis and forward-looking evaluation of current and potential risks on the basis of the facts as ascertained;

(iii) a summary and forward-looking assessment of all information;

(iv) the decisions on supervisory measures taken on the basis of the assessment and the implementation thereof; and

(v) the risk-based supervisory planning.

3.2.1 Risk Profile

(1) The risk profile comprises an evaluation of all an institution's risks, its organisation and internal control procedures and its internal capital adequacy. The Bundesbank shall carry out a forward-looking and risk-based evaluation of all the information it has collected, taking into consideration in the risk profile all the risks arising from the institution's business activity and its risk management and shall make suggestions for supervisory actions in agreement with BaFin, taking into account the data relevant to the institution and macroprudential findings as well as the requirements of the SREP. The risk profile shall be compiled on the basis of the structure and evaluation system developed jointly by the Bundesbank and BaFin for this purpose. The risk profile shall be compiled by the Bundesbank at least once a year by no later than 30 September and shall be passed on to BaFin for approval and any decision that needs to be made. In addition to the above, the Bundesbank shall update the risk profile during the course of the year in the event of its coming into possession of material additional information, especially if it results in a change in the evaluation of the institution in material areas or in the risk classification or if requested to do so by BaFin.

(2) The evaluations and classifications carried out by the Bundesbank must enable BaFin to properly assess the need for supervisory action or the need for further information on the basis of the institution's risk profile. BaFin shall add findings from other sources (e.g. meetings with banking industry associations), a classification as a problem institution/institution under intensive supervision, a conclusive assessment, proposed actions and the ECB's risk classification.

(3) The deadline given in (1) is subject to possible changes in the ECB's requirements.

3.2.2 Supervisory planning

(1) The supervisory planning shall include supervisory activities including the analysis of audit reports, supervisory interviews, audits carried out pursuant to section 44 of the KWG, supervisory stress tests and, if necessary, the setting of audit priorities pursuant to section 30 of the KWG. It specifies the priority areas of the supervisory activities. The audit planning shall specify which institutions, including their branches and subsidiaries in other member states, shall be audited. The SSM supervisory strategy must be taken into account

(2) The proposals for the supervisory and audit planning for the following year must be agreed between the two authorities by 15 November.

(3) BaFin shall determine the final supervisory planning by 15 December of each year. The planning shall take into account available Bundesbank and BaFin resources and aim to utilise capacities as evenly as possible throughout the year. Ad hoc deviations from the supervisory planning can be made by BaFin in agreement with the Bundesbank.

3.2.3 Notification of supervisory decisions

(1) BaFin shall have the final say on the compatibility of concrete or abstract facts with the relevant national, European or international legal norms, notices, circulars or other supervisory regulations in each case, in consultation with the Bundesbank. BaFin is responsible for the notification and reporting obligations to the ECB in the supervision of less significant institutions pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 6(6) and Article 6(7) of the SSM Regulation.

(2) BaFin shall normally base its supervisory measures on the audit findings and evaluations made by the Bundesbank in the course of its ongoing monitoring.

(3) Requests to institutions to rectify any shortcomings that have been identified shall be issued by BaFin. BaFin shall be responsible in particular for determining the content and the timeframe for rectifying the shortcomings. This is irrespective of whether the shortcomings were identified during the course of the audit of the annual accounts, audits of banking operations or other audits carried out pursuant to section 44 of the KWG or from any other sources.

(4) Problem institutions and institutions under intensified supervision shall be notified of and given an explanation of the final assessment of the institution based on the risk profile at meetings called specifically for that purpose and in principle led by BaFin. Other institutions may also be notified of and given an explanation of the risk profile agreed between BaFin and the Bundesbank at routine meetings.

3.3 Instruments for gaining knowledge of significant institutions

(1) Work in the JSTs shall be based on the provisions of the ECB Supervisory Manual and the principles laid out in section 2.1.

(2) The Bundesbank shall have lead responsibility for conducting audits within the SSM when required to do so by the ECB. The Bundesbank and BaFin are entitled to the right to attend the ECB's own audits as detailed in the ECB Supervisory Manual. The Bundesbank shall inform BaFin of irregularities identified during the course of audits. The Bundesbank shall send the audit report to the ECB and BaFin at the same time.

(3) The Bundesbank shall have lead responsibility for the evaluation of special inspection reports of third parties in the SSM.

(4) The Bundesbank shall analyse the annual accounts and audit reports that it receives pursuant to section 26 of the KWG. In so doing, in order to ensure a high standard of quality, it shall in principle apply the uniform analysis criteria developed jointly by BaFin and the Bundesbank, as far as is necessary.

3.4 Instruments for gaining knowledge of less significant institutions

3.4.1 Supervisory interviews

(1) Supervisory interviews shall be held on a routine or ad hoc basis. When determining the frequency, duration and depth of the supervisory interviews, the principle of proportionality shall be observed.

(2) Routine supervisory interviews with individual institutions will be used primarily for a routine discussion of the financial performance, risk situation and general business situation of the institutions on the basis of their annual accounts documents, once they have been analysed, and the agreed risk profiles. Subject to consultation with BaFin, these routine interviews may also extend to the rectification of any shortcomings that may have been identified for which there appears to be no need to take supervisory action. They shall in principle be conducted by the Bundesbank on an annual basis; in particular in the case of small institutions whose solvency is assured and which are unremarkable for supervisory purposes, annual supervisory interviews may be dispensed with. BaFin shall be entitled to take part. Routine supervisory interviews shall be planned by the Bundesbank well enough in advance for BaFin to be able to take part. If BaFin decides not to take part, it shall be informed of the outcome at the earliest possible opportunity.

(3) Ad hoc supervisory interviews will be concerned with facts or topics which require a special supervisory appraisal because of significant developments at the institution. Either the Bundesbank or BaFin may instigate ad hoc supervisory interviews; in either case they shall be coordinated between BaFin and the Bundesbank. BaFin shall in principle take the lead. If one authority decides not to take part, the other shall inform it of the outcome at the earliest possible opportunity (cf. 2.2.4).

3.4.2 Interviews with third parties

Part 3.4.1 (2) or (3) shall apply mutatis mutandis to interviews with audit firms or other third parties relating to individual institutions.

3.4.3 Analysis of annual accounts and audit reports pursuant to section 26 of the KWG

(1) The Bundesbank shall analyse the annual accounts and audit reports that it receives pursuant to section 26 of the KWG and shall prepare an analysis report for each institution. In so doing, in order to ensure a high standard of quality, it shall apply the uniform analysis criteria developed jointly by BaFin and the Bundesbank. BaFin may, if the need arises, specify areas on which the analysis should concentrate because they require particularly close attention. The results of the analysis shall be incorporated into the institution's risk profile.

(2) In individual cases, BaFin may demand a summary memorandum from the Bundesbank instead of an analysis report or may require the Bundesbank to first send a summary memorandum in advance of an analysis report. Should it be considered appropriate, the Bundesbank can suggest preparation of a summary memorandum instead of an analysis report.

(3) The order in which analyses are carried out by the Bundesbank is to be determined by the anticipated urgency of the cases, the relative risk situation of the institution and the seriousness of the findings of previous audit reports. Details shall be laid down in the supervisory planning, which shall if necessary be revised during the course of the year.

3.4.4 Information requests

In the case of requests for information that concern more than one institution, BaFin and the Bundesbank shall consult on the need for and substance of the collection of this information. The Bundesbank or BaFin can collect and analyse the information by prior agreement. The Bundesbank's power to collect information in pursuance of its financial stability responsibility shall remain unaffected (cf. Article 127(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and section 6 of the FinStabG).

3.4.5 Ordering and analysis of audits pursuant to section 44 of the KWG; other audits

(1) BaFin shall order the audits pursuant to section 44 (1) sentence 2 and section 44 (2) sentence 1 of the KWG and, if the audit is to be carried out by the Bundesbank, shall issue the audit mandate to the Head Office of the Bundesbank, which shall inform the institution of the composition of the audit team through the regional office of the Bundesbank responsible for the institution concerned. The composition of the audit team shall fall within the remit of the Bundesbank.

(2) If the audit mandate is awarded to third parties, BaFin shall inform the Bundesbank by sending it a copy of the audit mandate and shall ensure that a copy of the audit report is also sent to the Bundesbank without undue delay once it has been completed.

(3) BaFin and the Bundesbank shall consult on who shall be responsible for carrying out the analysis of the audit reports from special audits. All other audit reports, including the reports on audits of public and private deposit guarantee schemes, shall be analysed by the Bundesbank. If the need arises for supervisory measures to be applied as a result of serious findings, BaFin may undertake its own more in-depth analyses. The Bundesbank shall normally provide BaFin with the evaluation reports within two months of receiving the audit reports.

(4) In the case of audits which the Bundesbank has carried out, the Bundesbank shall provide BaFin with the audit report within two months of completing the audit. In exceptional, critical cases a shorter period may be agreed with BaFin.

(5) The Bundesbank shall inform the ECB, and at the same time also BaFin, of the results of audits it was commissioned by the ECB to carry out.

3.4.6 Audits of banking operations and BaFin's participation in audits

(1) Audits pursuant to section 44 of the KWG include the audits of banking operations (section 7 (1) of the KWG) carried out to assess institutions' capital adequacy and risk management process. These are the audits relating to compliance with sections 25a and 25b of the KWG based on the criteria of the Minimum Requirements for Risk Management (Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement – MaRisk), which are aimed at ensuring a proper business organisation and appropriate risk management, and audits relating to the supervisory authorisation and ongoing monitoring (inspection) of banks' internal risk measurement procedures (currently IRBA, AMA, market risk, liquidity models). Audits of banking operations are not audits of the recoverability of loans and the collateral furnished for them and loan risk provisioning, such as those carried out by audit firms when auditing the annual accounts or by way of special audits.

(2) As part of ongoing monitoring pursuant to section 7 (1) of the KWG, audits of banking operations shall be part of the ongoing monitoring of the Bundesbank and shall generally be carried out by its regional offices. In especially well-founded exceptional cases, BaFin may carry out such audits itself or, in consultation with the Bundesbank, also commission third parties to carry out audits of banking operations. This is without prejudice to the ECB's right to conduct audits at less significant institutions.

(3) BaFin may participate in audits conducted by the Bundesbank; with the consent of the Bundesbank, BaFin may perform audit procedures and audit particular audit areas under the audit mandate. This applies mutatis mutandis in cases where BaFin conducts audits pursuant to (2) sentence 2.

(4) Irregularities identified during the course of an audit of banking operations shall be reported to BaFin and the relevant regional office of the Bundesbank without undue delay. The Bundesbank shall send BaFin the audit reports as a rule within two months after concluding the audit of banking operations.

3.4.7 Stress tests

BaFin and the Bundesbank work closely together in conducting supervisory stress tests within the meaning of section 6b (3) of the KWG and in accordance with requirements of the European Banking Authority (EBA) under Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The Bundesbank conducts additional stress tests on a regular basis in accordance with the supervisory planning or when such tests appear necessary based on its findings.

3.5 Reporting and notification system

3.5.1 Transmission of reports to the ECB

The Bundesbank shall transmit incoming data sets, documents and information on the reporting and notification system and on data processing to the ECB. In so doing, it shall ensure that BaFin receives direct access to the received data, documents and information.

3.5.2 Reporting and notification systems of less significant institutions

(1) Reports filed under the KWG and regulations issued on the basis thereof shall be processed by the Bundesbank. It shall if necessary further clarify the facts, evaluate them and present them to BaFin at the earliest possible opportunity. It shall inform BaFin without undue delay of significant irregularities and of any critical developments. In this connection the Bundesbank may offer BaFin opinions and put forward suggestions for any further action. The final supervisory assessment of and decision on the facts shall rest with BaFin.

(2) BaFin and the Bundesbank shall agree on any further course of action upon receipt of the notification if the relevant legal provisions require particular urgency, which is especially the case for sections 2c, 28 (1) or 29 (3) of the KWG. The final supervisory decision shall rest with BaFin.

3.6 Data processing

(1) The Bundesbank shall undertake the timely recording and analysis of all notifications and reports, the contents of annual accounts, audit reports and the returns required under section 25 of the KWG on its electronic data processing system. It shall ensure that BaFin has unrestricted and direct access to all the data sets and information recorded on the system that are needed for supervisory purposes; these shall also include the information collected for the purposes of the monthly balance sheet statistics.

(2) The technical framework shall be agreed between BaFin and the Bundesbank. Details shall be decided by common consent.

4 Fundamental and cross-sectoral issues

(1) The final interpretation of fundamental and cross-sectoral issues shall essentially be provided by BaFin. This is without prejudice to the remit of the ECB.

(2) In order to avoid duplicating work, plans and projects of fundamental importance for supervision shall be coordinated between the Bundesbank and BaFin. These plans and projects will be of fundamental importance especially when they are intended to promote the further development of supervisory law and supervisory instruments.

5 BaFin's Strategy and Risk Committee and Committee on Ongoing Supervision

(1) BaFin has a cross-directorate Strategy and Risk Committee. BaFin shall establish an external interface with the Bundesbank.

(2) The banking supervision of the Bundesbank and BaFin shall establish a Committee on Ongoing Supervision. This shall as a rule meet quarterly at the Bundesbank and BaFin in turn and can also if required be convened at short notice between two regular meetings.

(3) The Committee on Ongoing Supervision shall serve to set the direction of strategic and operational issues in banking supervision at the Bundesbank and BaFin and exchange information on risk-based issues. Findings made shall be fed into the supervisory strategy and supervisory planning which are provided to the ECB for informational purposes.

6 Final provisions

6.1 Fundamental issues relating to the application of the Supervisory Guideline

Individual issues of fundamental importance relating to the application of this Supervisory Guideline shall be discussed between BaFin and the Bundesbank at regular intervals. Further arrangements governing the supervisory processes and interfaces between BaFin and the Bundesbank shall be laid down by BaFin as and when required in consultation with the Bundesbank.

In addition to this Supervisory Guideline, further coordination and the agreement of further guidelines on cooperation between BaFin and the Bundesbank may occur within the context of the JST.

6.2 Resolution of differences of opinion

Differences of opinion between BaFin and the Bundesbank occurring in ongoing monitoring shall be jointly resolved. This shall occur in the regular meetings between the heads of banking supervision at the Bundesbank and BaFin. Should no agreement be achieved in such forum on considerably important differences of opinion, section 4a sentence 2 of the Financial Services Supervision Act (Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht FinDAG) shall apply.

6.3 Entry into force

This Supervisory Guideline shall come into force with immediate effect. It shall replace the Guideline of 21 May 2013.

Bonn und Frankfurt, 19 December 2016